Technological University Dublin

ARROW@TU Dublin
Articles

Graduate School of Creative Arts and Media

2019

Traversing states: a reflection on digital technology and
Simondon's critique of hylomorphism
Michael O'Hara

Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/gradcamart
Part of the Digital Humanities Commons, Other Arts and Humanities Commons, Other Philosophy
Commons, and the Philosophy of Science Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Graduate School of Creative Arts and Media at
ARROW@TU Dublin. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles by an authorized administrator of ARROW@TU
Dublin. For more information, please contact
arrow.admin@tudublin.ie, aisling.coyne@tudublin.ie,
gerard.connolly@tudublin.ie.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License

Culture, Theory and Critique

ISSN: 1473-5784 (Print) 1473-5776 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rctc20

Traversing states: a reflection on digital
technology and Simondon's critique of
hylomorphism
Michael O’Hara
To cite this article: Michael O’Hara (2019) Traversing states: a reflection on digital technology
and Simondon's critique of hylomorphism, Culture, Theory and Critique, 60:3-4, 223-236, DOI:
10.1080/14735784.2019.1677485
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14735784.2019.1677485

Published online: 21 Oct 2019.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 232

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rctc20

CULTURE, THEORY AND CRITIQUE
2019, VOL. 60, NOS. 3–4, 223–236
https://doi.org/10.1080/14735784.2019.1677485

Traversing states: a reﬂection on digital technology and
Simondon’s critique of hylomorphism
Michael O’Hara
GradCAM, Technological University Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
ABSTRACT

In this article, I examine Simondon’s concept of the technical object
reﬂecting on its analogous relationship to digital technology.
Intrinsic to such an analysis is Simondon’s distinction between the
abstract and concrete and his speciﬁc critique of the hylomorphic
model. In a deeply rich example, Simondon, contra Aristotle,
mobilises the process of mould-making as an exemplar of the
modulated ensemble of forces that preﬁgure any formations of
matter through form. I analyse Simondon’s paradigmatic criticism
while at the same time carving out the potential intersections that
emerge through the kinaesthetic awareness of the body. By doing
so I highlight the implicit relational formation that occurs
through the process of object making that is at odds with
ontologies that underpin digital technology. Finally, I analyse
how the transformation of object making realised through digital
fabrication radically transforms our relationship to objects
claiming that such technology remains beholden to hylomorphic
schemata.

This article examines Simondon’s concept of the technical object and his associated critique of traditional accounts of object relations. In the ﬁrst section, I focus on Simondon’s
account of the transition between the abstract and concrete, applying such a genetic analysis to digital technology, speciﬁcally computer code. In subsequent sections, I examine
Simondon’s criticism of information, underlining the implicit epistemologies that underpin cybernetics while focusing on hylomorphic examples furnished by Simondon.
Through such examples I attempt to re-introduce the role the body plays in the production
of technical objects, suggesting that it complicates such hylomorphic models. Mindful of
this analysis of the body, the ﬁnal section interrogates the design and modes of digital production through Simondon’s philosophy.

Abstract and concrete transitions
Simondon, in Chapter 1 of On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects [MEOT] (2017),
distinguishes between the abstract and concrete, proposing that artisanal/hand-made
objects correspond to the abstract stage of technical evolution while the concrete stage
of technical objects is deﬁned through industrial production. The abstract stage of the
CONTACT Michael O’Hara
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technical object is conceived as a closed system comprised of an assemblage of parts that
remain divisible and less integrated while the process of technical concretisation integrates
parts into wholes. Concretisation marks the progress of a technical object from abstract
structures to new regimes of functioning instantiated through operation. Citing the
example of the engine, Simondon marks the evolution of the technical object through processes of concretisation, where integrated parts, or what he terms as technical elements,
reach a degree of harmony and synchronicity, so that the engine has a coherence and
unity within itself (Simondon 2017: 25–40).
Concretisation is not a linear process born of abstraction but one implicated by reciprocal causal relations that are manifest in the development of the technical object in its operation – how the engine works in reality. For Simondon, operation or allagmatics denotes
the reciprocity between operation and structure and the process of individuation generated through relations. This axiomatic principle is realised in his concept of transduction,
which is a process of phase shifts in information, the operation of a system as it moves
between states. Simondon furnishes the changing state of a crystal as a paradigmatic
example. As Muriel Combes states:
Transduction expresses the processual sense of individuation; this is why it holds for any
domain, and the determination of domains (matter, life, mind, society) relies on diverse
regimes of individuation (physical, biological, psychic, collective). (Combes 2013: 7)

Through such transformation, the technical object moves beyond the abstract, generating forces that ‘produce eﬀects that are independent of the fabricating intention’ (Simondon 2017: 39). He gives the example of the cylinder head and the reciprocating function of
cooling ﬁns. When these diﬀerent technical elements converge (the ﬁns are cut as part of
the head instead of a separate component) there is a convergence of function. The resulting
convergence marks the very process of concretisation. Through its operation the technical
object evolves through a set of phase shifts that are ‘essential, discontinuous improvements,
as a result of which the internal schema of the technical object is modiﬁed in leaps and
bounds and not according to a continuous line’ (Simondon 2017: 43). Although technical
objects tend toward the concrete, they remain imbued with residual aspects of abstraction.
Additionally, the concrete technical object is charged with its function but remains open – it
is never fully known or concrete allowing it to shed its artiﬁcial character. In this sense it
approaches the ‘mode of existence of natural objects’ (Simondon 2017: 49) which are,
according to Simondon, concrete right from the start.
This movement between the abstract and concrete becomes a key feature in thinking
the algorithm and its formation in code. It is the openness of the concrete technical
object, which I suggest is analogous to the algorithm and its implementation in computer
programming languages. Algorithms are often considered to exist primarily at the level of
abstraction, as quasi-mathematical entities. It is only when the algorithm is parsed in a
programming language that it moves toward the concrete domain, ﬁnally realised and
implemented in hardware. I propose that algorithms are a nexus of the abstract and concrete, and following Timothy Colburn are a set of relations materialised in a computational process:
It is concrete because it can be described as the passing of electrons in circuits measured in
microns, eﬀecting changes in the state of semiconducting memory elements. On the other
hand, the description of these state changes is a program that, as an expression in a
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formal language, is an abstraction of a process the programmer hopes is a correct model of
the solution of a problem in the real world. (Colburn 2000: 190)

I suggest the algorithm can be considered as traversing states, or in Simondonian terms
existing in a metastable state, charged with potentials that are carried through from stages
of abstraction in code through to implementation in hardware. Metastability deﬁnes an
equilibrium that retains sources of tension and momentum – a process of structuration
which remains provisional allowing the system to evolve and change over time. The algorithm exists in a metastable state while programming languages are in eﬀect the concrete
implementation in a formal language of an abstract concept. Programming languages represent the collation of technical elements in the form of compilers, access rights and layout
rules that are not algorithmic but procedural aspects of the program that are responsible
for the implementation of such algorithms. Compilers are designed to convert and
implement high level language statements into machine readable form that must be
broken down character by character into short words, symbols and numbers into sets
of machine code instructions that activate physical circuits. This points to the multilayered and hierarchical privileging existing within programming languages and its perceived separation from hardware.1 When speaking of implementation, I mean – what a
piece of code does when executed or run. In computational terms, this is akin to the
process of concretisation of a system.
Consistent with Simondon, programming languages remain indebted to residual
aspects of abstraction in the form of schemas and mathematical objects. Simondon
notes that abstraction underpins the idealisation of scientiﬁc representation. The sign or
symbolisation comes to represent a ‘pure schema of functioning’ that still allows type to
be determined by the function of the technical object – ‘the pure technical schema
deﬁnes a type of existence of the technical object, grasped in its ideal function’ (Simondon
2017: 45). Simondon asserts that symbolisation theoretically schematises the function of
the technical object. Likewise, Raymond Turner in Computational Artifacts (2018)
notes the ‘structural isomorphism’ between the schematic and the physical circuit.
(Turner 2018: 39) This does not necessarily entail correct implementation demanding
the physical circuit behave in accordance with the modes of abstraction inherent within
the schema. This is the translation of form from virtual to actual through operation
that determines correctness within the physical system.
But even when this is completed there is no mathematical guarantee of correctness. Unlike
the correctness between the functional and structural speciﬁcations, this is an empirical
notion of correctness that is to be tested by physical, not mathematical means. This is the
abstract-concrete interface. The functional speciﬁcation is a mathematical object … In contrast, an electronic device is a concrete physical thing. (Turner 2018: 39)

For Simondon, such representation is an articulation of an abstract technical object that
is primitive and ‘not a natural physical system, it is a physical translation of an intellectual
system’ (Simondon 2017: 49). The movement toward concretisation is expressed through
operation in physical instantiation, and as Turner notes, not by mathematical means.
1

This is an argument put forward by Fredrich Kittler in his seminal text ‘There is No Software’ (1995). Kittler places responsibility for such a privileging of software at the genesis of the Turing machine, the ancestor of the microprocessor; ‘ … the
physical Church-Turing hypothesis, by identifying physical hardware with the algorithms forged for its computation, has
ﬁnally gotten rid of hardware itself’ (Kittler 1995: 151).
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Furthermore, I argue programming languages continue to privilege a distinction
between form and content, explicitly evidenced in the Object-Oriented Programming
(OOP) paradigm. OOP was developed in the mid-1970s by computer scientist Alan
Kay.2 OOP is best understood as the process of breaking programs into distinct classes,
modules and objects. Such classes are packaged as templates for the creation of an
object which describe attributes and properties of those objects. The class represents a
schema or deﬁned idea of the object but not the object itself. It describes the conditions
of the possibility of objects and their level of function. Therefore, classes and modules
operate as the morphe (form) aspect of the language while the hyle (data) are the code
that constitutes objects, bearing as we shall see, a striking resemblance to hylomorphic
schema. Consequently, computational ontologies remain indebted to traditional epistemological and metaphysical assumptions aligned to various substance-based ontologies
and theories of information, some emerging concurrently with Simondon’s major works.

Information and its ontologies
Simondon articulates a distinction between natural and technical systems which amounts
to a critique of cybernetics and its theory of information. Cybernetics is conceived by
mathematician Norbert Weiner, as the ‘view that the structure of the machine or of
the organism is an index of the performance that may be expected from it’ (Weiner
1989: 58). It is characterised as privileging the concept of feedback in a system, seeing
it as not only an underlying principle inherent in machines but intrinsic to organic
systems. For some working in cybernetics this becomes an analogical principle that
morphs into an isomorphism between the machine and organism. Although Simondon
is sympathetic to the inter-disciplinary nature of cybernetics and its ambition to
examine the complexity of systems and their organisation, he rejects its tendency to formalise an explanatory system that can be mapped onto living organisms. This is the
misuse of analogy between the living and the technical that focuses on external aspects
of systems while ignoring the energetic forces operating between the technical object
and its milieu.
For Simondon, the traditional philosophical (and cybernetic) view concentrates on analogical relations of structure and form. He proposes an analogy of operation or allagmatics,
that reveals the energy operating between structures. Simondon is drawing out a position
that is demonstrably at odds with the philosophical tradition, not only in his conception of
the technical object, but with the deeper ontological question of being itself. He rejects substance-based ontologies that conceive the individual as an expression of a pre-existing
form or essence. In atomistic understandings, the principle of individuation is already
given as individual atoms that merge into more complex systems. Simondon posits the
complex idea of individuation as becoming that is ﬂuid and non-linear, determining the
individual as neither ﬁxed nor stable.
Simondon also refutes the Aristotelian notions of hylomorphism which sees individuals
as compounds consisting of matter and form. For Aristotle, matter (hyle) characterises the
material from which an object is generated while the form determines what the object is.
For Aristotle, form does not merely denote the mere shape of an object but characterises its
2

Examples include Kay’s Smalltalk and more contemporary examples such as C++, Pearl and Java.
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essence – for example the essence of an oak tree residing in an acorn.3 This has its origins
in Aristotle’s four modes of causation – material, formal, eﬃcient and ﬁnal. An object’s
ﬁnal cause, its function determines what a thing is for and in the Physics this represents
not only the functional telos of technical artefacts but can be seen in the telos of the
natural world.4
In MEOT, Simondon critiques the hylemorphic schema through the activity of the
craftsperson.5 He oﬀers the example of the making of the mould so it is ‘capable of receiving information’ (Simondon 2017: 249) The clay/hyle is pressed into the mould/morphe,
taking form according to the mould. This is the classic Aristotelian account of the emergence of the object – form imposing order on matter. However, for Simondon, it is neither
the mould/morphe nor the craftsperson that is responsible for the articulation of form but
the ‘mediation that fulﬁls itself on its own once the conditions have been created’ (Simondon 2017: 249). Internal resonance is instigated through such processes, mediated by the
craftsperson but not realised through them. Internal resonance designates the self-adaptation of the technical object as it reaches a degree of harmony and synchronicity with
its milieu.
In L’individu et sa genèse physico-biologique, [IG] (1964), Simondon’s questioning of
the technical nature of mould-making (and importantly the body) appears more circumspect. Again, he focuses upon the practice of mould-making but here the mediation of the
craftsperson is distinguished from the hylomorphic model. Simondon claims that the
matter is agential, open to actualisation, revealing the internal resonances of energy that
are latent within the clay substrate. In concordance with Simondon, I contend that in practice the material one casts with is intrinsic to the type of mould used.6 The performance of
the mould – its ability to ‘enclose’ – is determined as much by the material being cast. In
the case of the clay brick, one cannot use a silicon (water resistant) mould to cast bricks.
Silicon rubber prevents the necessary absorption of water from the clay slip and the
necessary transmission of potential energy. If the water is retained within the clay, the
form can never take shape – the clay remains between states. The intimate relationship
between clay slip and plaster mould is critical to the rendering of form. Plaster absorbs
the water from clay through a transductive process that is the becoming of form itself.
Transduction marks the regulative function of the mould and the localised indeterminacy
of the clay material. However, transduction is also active within the mould itself, as the
mould must possess the potential energy that provides the conditions of its operation.
The cast is never fully constituted through the mould as it exists in a metastable state –
suspended between energy and structure. The coming into being of the object is made
possible by degrees of potentiality of not just the mould but the molecular changes and
modulation occurring through the crystal structures of kaolinite, one of the important
minerals in clay. Its crystal-like structures are linked with hydrogen bonds that amplify
‘For as the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, or the matter and the formless before receiving form to anything
which has form, so is the underlying nature to substance, i.e. the ‘this’ or existent.’ (Aristotle 1984: 722–723) Aristotle ﬁrst
introduces his notion of matter and form in the ﬁrst book of the Physics but it becomes a conceptual cornerstone in his
broader philosophical works.
4
See Aristotle 1984: Physics, Book II, 8, 750–754).
5
We highlight Simondon’s example of mould-making as it furnishes a description of a technology developed in antiquity
representing the ﬁrst instantiation of a reproductive process of object making en masse.
6
The author speaks here from personal experience as a trained and practicing mould-maker. There is great insight to
Simondon’s description of the process.
3
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the physical and energetic changes in the clay, enabling the brick to take shape in the
mould.
This returns us to Simondon’s theory of allagmatics which contrasts with the notion of
information articulated in cybernetics. He conceives information in a more primary sense,
information that is not merely quantiﬁable. As Simon Mills argues, for Simondon
his notion of information shifts his theorization away from the sender-receiver model which
cyberneticians such as Wiener found so useful in developing analogies between animals and
machines. Instead his notion of information as ontogenetic, that is, as the becoming which is
being, still enables systems to condition themselves but via processes of structuration and resonance. (Mills 2016: 47)

Simondon’s commitment to a philosophy of becoming or ontogenesis conceives of a
system rich in potential striving forward toward new structurations. Such a genesis preﬁgures the object and technical reality denoting the pre-individual fund, the very condition
of being itself. The pre-individual expresses the metastable equilibrium of being that is full
of potential individuations. Information understood as individuated and discrete cannot
account for processes of individuation . In the case above, the molecular changes of the
kalonite are a singularity that as information enable communication with hydrogen
bonds which excite transformations of the clay in the mould. This metastable state
‘dephases’ to a diﬀerent level or mode of individuation as the clay tends towards new structurations. I suggest that the mediation of the craftsperson, which Simondon describes, is
not riveted to a hylomorphic account; and argue that the body, in a phenomenological
sense, although implicated in the hylomorphic model, escapes its explanatory bonds. I
brieﬂy turn to Edmund Husserl’s account of hylomorphism and concept of the body to
show how such an account returns us Simondon’s distinction between the abstract and
concrete.

The enactive body
In Ideas I (1983), Husserl ﬁrst introduces the term hyle referring to the raw data of perception: the sensuous data such as colour-data, sound-data, touch-data, etc. For
Husserl, hyletic data are primed and given sense through intentional consciousness in
the original act of perception. ‘Sensuous Data present themselves as stuﬀs for intentive
formings, or sense-bestowings, belonging to diﬀerent levels’ (Husserl 1983: 204). Husserl’s
concept of hyletic data has been critiqued by many philosophers for appearing to essentialise and objectify sense data from a world of meaning. For Aron Gurwitsch, Husserl
does not attend to the importance of the hyletic data noting there is a problem of what
he terms the mediation of such data through consciousness; ‘What is immediately
given, the phenomenological primal material, is given only as articulated and structured’
(Gurwitsch 2009: 284). The fact that hyle is given to reﬂection is a conceit that undermines
the givenness of sensuous data. Intentionality bestows sense on that which has no sense
and cannot be bestowed on that which already has sense or intention. This marks the
‘problem of givenness’ of the data in the ﬁrst place, something which Simondon critiques
as a substance already individuated.
However, I wish to separate Husserl’s hylomorphic account from the more forceful
Aristotelian account that Simondon disagrees with. In contrast to Aristotelean
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hylomorphism, the later Husserl stresses a passively pregiven perceptual realm that subtends any intentional act. According to Kenneth Williford, the hyle represent a shift in
Husserl’s late thinking, the ‘hyletic data come to us in the context of a pregiven order
and are, as it were, primed for intentional animation’ (Williford 2013: 510).7 On this
view, the hyletic data become a bi-directional link between consciousness and the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) which exist in advance of us, with aﬀective capacities to shape consciousness itself.
Furthermore, I argue for the importance the body plays in Husserl’s account, returning
us to the role of the craftsperson and the embodied act of mould-making. The lived/motile
body (lieb) is the source of kinaesthesia, generating a diﬀerent account of hyletic data, one
constitutive of the lived body of the perceiver and object perceived. As he states in Ideas II
(1989), ‘a human being’s total consciousness is in a certain sense, by means of its hyletic
substrate, bound to the lived body’ (Husserl 1989: 160). For Husserl, hyletic data are only
given through the kinaesthetic experience of a lived body and such experience is a form of
bodily self-awareness that is integral to the perception of any object and is composed of an
outer horizon of cultural predicates.8
Such ideas have been integrated into contemporary theories of embodiment, such as
enactive accounts proposed by Evan Thompson (2007) and Lambros Malafouris (2013)
among others. Enactivism focuses upon the rich dynamical relations that occur
amongst the brain, body and environment that also reject the hylomorphic model.9 As
Thompson articulates in Mind in Life (2007), the enactive approach proposes:
that subjectivity and consciousness have to be explicated in relation to the autonomy and
intentionality of life, in a full sense of “life” that encompasses […] the organism, one’s subjectively lived body, and the life-world. (Thompson 2007: 15)

Enactivism gives a more relational account of agency by proposing a dynamic and
materially engaged account of action – we think with and through things in action. I
propose that enactivism, building upon Husserl’s concept of the ‘I can’ (which perceives
objects in the environment in terms of what we can do with them), echoes Simondon’s
account of material engagement as outlined above.
This idea of material engagement is particularly evidenced in the work of Malafouris
and his contention of the energetic transactions that occur through the engagement
with materials and the kinaesthetic gestures of the body. In How Things Shape the
Mind, Malafouris (2013) coins the term ‘Material Engagement Theory’ to describe the
interdependent relationship between the maker and the object. He mobilises the
example of the potter on the wheel and the processes that emerge from such interaction.
According to Malafouris, a dynamic coupling occurs between the potter and the clay as the
object emerges through the pressing, pulling and constricting of the clay. The metastable
nature of the process is not merely underwritten by the potter’s skill but the attunement of
See Husserl, Experience and Judgment: ‘This implies that the sensuous data brought into prominence by abstraction are
themselves already unities of identity which appear in a multiform manner and which, as unities, can then themselves
become thematic objects […]’ (Husserl 1973: 73).
8
Although mobilising Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Hubert Dreyfus’ arguments against Artiﬁcial Intelligence reﬂect a
similar argument. In What Computers Still Can’t Do Dreyfus (1992) argues for the organised, embodied human practices
that shape our very experience of objects. Although beyond the scope of this paper, his argument can be applied to the
ontology that informs Object Orientated Programming languages (OOP) as discussed above.
9
Enactivism emerged as an alternative to explanatory models of consciousness that are interwoven with early information
theory, cognitive science and functionalism.
7
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the body, the slake of clay, and an ensemble of conditions involved in the traversing of
states. Malafouris articulates a notion of the hylonoetic ﬁeld that argues against the hylomorphic ontology of imposing form. Instead he asserts that such a hylonoetic ontology is a
‘thinking through and with matter’ that involves a ‘a great deal of approximation, anticipation, and guessing about how the material will behave’ (Malafouris 2013: 236). The
object that emerges is the result of the potentialities between individual and milieu that
I claim remain proximate with our embodied being in the world and at odds with computational ontologies which I return to in the ﬁnal section.

Simondon – potential adaptations
How do these rich accounts of the emergence of the clay object through the kinaesthetic
gestures of the body compare to Simondon’s analysis? I propose that Malafouris’ notion of
the hylonoetic ﬁeld captures the mediation that Simondon describes in the process of
mould-making. There is the emergence of the clay brick through the (bodily) engagement
of the craftsperson. However, Simondon appears to read artisanal production as abstract,
thereby associating it within the hylomorphic schema. In MEOT, Simondon frames the
body through artisanal production and links toolmaking explicitly to the extension of
the body and organ. In his example of mould-making the gestures and habits of the
body are marked as motivating factors for the ‘two technical half chains, the one starting
from form and the one starting from matter’ (Simondon 2017: 249) – i.e. the hylomorphic
schema.
However, in IG, Simondon suggests the hand is occupied in the process of modulation
and mediation of form.
the gesture of the workman who ﬁlls the mold and compresses the clay continues the former
gesture of kneading, stretching, shaping: the mold plays the part of a ﬁxed set of modelling
hands, acting like arrested forming hands. (Simondon 1964: 31)

Recall here Malafouris’ hand as it anticipates and approximates the behaviour of the
material. Later Simondon speculates that ‘individuated being is never individuated
more perfectly than when it leaves the hands of the craftsman’ (Simondon 1964: 35).
Through his concept of individuation, the process of coming into being, he furnishes us
with a rich account of enaction, one that is not circumscribed to a body that only
adapts to an environment. For Simondon to think adaptation, one must go beyond the
constraints of adaptation as understood in the biology of evolutionary and cybernetic
theory. In L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information, Simondon
(2013) critiques the implicit hylomorphic model that is embedded within the biological
account of adaptation. He contends that adaptation ‘is understood as a reciprocal and
complex inﬂuence on the basis of the hylomorphic schema’ (Simondon 2013: 208).10
Adaptation closes down rather than opens up the potential of the living being. As JeanHugues Barthélémy describes:
he insists on the fact that the biologism of adaptation is “a biologism without ontogenesis,” he
does not berate it for forgetting the conditions of adaptation that would be less than
‘est conçue comme une inﬂuence réciproque et complexe à base de schéma hylémorphique’ (Simondon 2013: 208). I
thank my colleague Jonathan Mitchell for his translation of this section of the book.

10
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adaptation, but for reducing an activity of the living being that is more than adaptation to
adaptation. (Barthélémy 2015: 28–29)

The living being is individuated through transductive processes which are not merely conditioned through adaptation to an environment. This rejection of adaptation coheres with
his critique of cybernetics. Simondon argues that there must remain a clear distinction
between form and information. For Simondon, living things need information while
machines deal in forms.
The living transforms information into forms, the a posteriori into a priori; but this a priori is
always oriented toward the reception of information to be interpreted. The machine on the
contrary has been built according to a certain number of schemas, and it functions in a determinate way; its technicity, its functional concretisation at the level of the element are determinations of forms. (Simondon 2017: 150)

It is this privileging of form and its dominant role in the machinic which, as already
suggested, persists in aspects of digital technology.
I foreground the role that action has in Simondon’s account of individuation, mindful
of the enactive paradigm of thinking with and through things in action. The body is implicated in such transductive processes, but it is a body that is emergent and individuated
through an ensemble of forces and energetic transformations. Brian Massumi, following
Simondon, gives us the means to think the body through such processes of transduction
by delineating a body that is a ‘thinking-feeling body […] operating as a transducer’
(Massumi 2002: 135). The body is not only individuated through transduction but is a
‘transducer of the virtual’ (Massumi 2002: 135).11 The body that creates a mould,
shapes the clay pot, is a body that is an assemblage of forces that are not merely adapting
or producing, but transducing through a range of vital relations within the gesture of the
body from cell activation, to the activity of the nervous system and brain, and a host of
other collective modes of individuation.
However, even this does not dissolve a tension in Simondon’s deﬁnition of artisanal
production which appears at odds with such modes of transduction. In MEOT, Simondon
deﬁnes artisanal production as abstract in nature and subject to a made-to-measure
schema which bears the hallmarks of gesture and bodily extension, an object that in
fact lacks ‘intrinsic measure’ (Simondon 2017: 29). It is only in the industrial age that
the object, no longer abstract, circumscribed by gesture, escapes the bonds of abstraction
acquiring the ‘power to shape a civilisation’ (Simondon 2017: 29) as it becomes concrete.
But are tools or hand-made objects not concrete? Have not such objects also begotten the
power to shape civilisations?
For Simondon, technical objects are always embedded in technical ensembles that are
both subject to and productive of social, political and economic forces. By bracketing tools
and hand-made artefacts as abstract, Simondon appears to delimit their potential to generate similar productive forces. There are multiple instances throughout history where the
development of a new tool engendered profound changes in the trajectory of civilisations,
e.g. the development of the axe head, the stirrup or gunpowder; all of which developed
through modes of artisanal production. As Katherine Hayles notes, tools share these
11

The virtual, following Deleuze, is that which is not actual or realised, existing in the realm of potentials. One of the aspects
of Deleuze’s idea of the virtual is its generative nature, to realise potentials that although not material are real. See
Deleuze (1991, chapter 5) and Deleuze (1995, chapters 4 and 5).
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productive characteristics that Simondon assigns to concrete objects and she disagrees
with Simondon’s reductive deﬁnition of tools by claiming ‘tools as part of technics, and
indeed an especially important category because of their capacity for catalysing exponential change’ (Hayles 2012: 90). Hayles, mobilising research on compound tools, denotes
how the development of tools such as the stone axe led to the rapid increase in the
Broca area of the brain, enabling the subsequent expansion and development of
language.12
Tool fabrication in this view resulted in cognitive changes that facilitated the capacity for
language, which in turn further catalyzed the development of more (and more sophisticated)
compound tools. (Hayles 2012: 91)

Hayles is keen to establish a theory of co-evolution of embodied human cognition and
technics that continues with the development of digital technology. In concordance with
Simondon, she reiterates that technical ensembles ‘create technical individuals; they are
also called into existence by technical individuals’ (Hayles 2012: 89). Embodiment, for
Hayles, relies on ideas outlined earlier through enactive models of cognition, but locates
such models within the contemporary milieu of code, digital tools, objects, networks
and environments. As I shall suggest there is a blurring of what an object is and can
become through current digital fabrication technologies.

The digitalised object
The development of digital technologies has led to a complex infrastructure of tools and
fabricating techniques that are responsible for the production of other tools and digital
artefacts. Contemporary modes of production such as laser cutters and 3D printers
further extend the understanding of the technical object. The digital object, as conceived
by Yuk Hui (2016) in On the Existence of Digital Objects, gives us a new way to think about
the materialisation of data. The genealogy that Hui traces draws out the explicit computational ontologies that are intrinsic to the processing of data and information. The distinction between form and content continues to reﬂect the hierarchical organisation
encoded in digital objects. It articulates a set of relations that appear abstract and immaterial in nature but are, as indicated with the example of the algorithm, a set of materialised
relations that subtend and mediate between form and content.
This technology epitomised through CNC machines, laser cutters and 3D printers push
the transition of the digital object into the terrain of the materialised or what I call the
‘digitalised object’. This digitalised object, a derivation of Hui’s digital object, is a materialisation of data into the domain of the natural or real object. Such fabrication requires the
translation of an object from the real world into discrete bits that become available for
manipulation. It represents at a discrete level the transmission and transformation of
ones and zeroes into physical layers on a 3D print bed or subtraction/carving of a physical
material on a CNC machine or laser cutter.
Digitalised objects are often the culmination of industrial design concepts expressed in
3D form. The process of design relies on powerful CAD based software that operate in a
12

Bernard Stiegler is another who articulates the crucial role that the development of the tool had on the emergence of the
human. Stiegler, following Leroi-Gourhan, claims that ‘the human invents himself in the technical by inventing the tool –
by becoming exteriorised techno-logically.’ (Stiegler 1998: 141)
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reticular virtual space of geometry. The design of objects in virtual space is predicated on
complex interaction of other digital objects at the interface level. Text buttons and icons
solicit the user to draw lines, construct planes, extrude, pull and push digital material
through virtual space. The object is exported out of the primary CAD programme and
converted to G-Code, a basic scripted numeric control language that translates the integrity of the object across to the CNC/3D platform. This transitional space between the
virtual and the real is the interoperable space between diﬀerent language platforms,
which implement the physical manifestation of the object in real space. It signiﬁes the
parsing of the algorithm, the transition of abstract code to the concretisation of a material
object. Data is given as object to the user, an object is created by the user, the object is
dematerialised or broken down to data, rematerialised as a physical object – object
remains given as data.
Data → digital object → data → digitalised object
This digitalised object exists across diﬀerent registers of digital space, realised through a
transductive process as an artefact in real space yet like the algorithm traversing states. The
digitalised object, as reticulated data, is repeatable as a print and communicable as a discrete ﬁle. Its reproduction in material form is inﬁnitely realisable across time and space,
and its (re)production is automated and animated though multiple robotic gestures and
movements. The process of reproduction, the object inﬁnitely repeatable in multiple
forms, has passed from the technology of the mould-maker to the milieu of the digital.
In Shaping Things Bruce Sterling (2005) conceives of the ‘whatness’ of such objects as
the very transformation of the object into mutable data that is recycled into a variety of
what he labels as ‘SPIMES’ – deﬁned as virtual smart objects that can be physically incarnated and geo-located e.g. the Internet of Things (IOTs). Echoing Hui, the SPIME is a set of
relations ﬁrst and is only instantiated as an object when needed. ‘In an age of SPIMES, the
object is no longer an object but an instantiation’ (Sterling 2005: 79). In Sterling’s account
such technologies move the object beyond limited conceptualisations in time and space.
Similarly, the emergence of a digitalised object, manufactured from a 3-D model, is a culmination of a set of relationships of data across a multitude of planes, from coded data,
coded object to physical object. Echoing Simondon, Sterling claims that such models of
objects are more open than real or natural objects. They can be deployed, developed and
replicated by a variety of creative users such as designers, engineers, artists, etc.
In her more recent work Hayles, again citing the inﬂuence of Simondon, underlines the
co-emergence of cognition and technics, noting how large-scale networks and algorithms
perform complex decision making that is recursive and feed forward into human cognition as forms of non-conscious cognition. Digital technologies represent further externalisations of human cognitive processes. She notes that computational media are not merely
another technology because they operate within ‘complex ecologies’ and have ‘stronger
evolutionary potential’ than any other form of technology due to their networked structure
and problem-solving capacities (Hayles 2017: 34). Although these assertions are consistent
with Simondon’s allagmatics they highlight how such relations ‘feed forward’ into social
and political discourse around technology.
This resonates with the ‘problem of the given’ that I outlined in Husserl’s work above.
But here the problem of the given is manifest in the production of the hylomorphic
schema in computational ontologies. It is these imperceptible aspects of computational

234

M. O’HARA

techniques of data processing and production that are reconﬁguring the very nature of the
sensory ﬁeld. It requires a rethink of what is given in this manifold of data that preﬁgures
and shapes our relations to objects. What are the implicit biases inherent within the givenness of such data and objects, and how are they shaped by forces of capital and culture?
Simon Mills claims that although Simondon’s account of the technical object oﬀers a
powerful account of technical evolution, it lacks a substantive account of the cultural
and social forces that play a key role in such evolution. According to Mills this is evidenced
in the development and deployment of software in ﬁnancial markets and social media sites
such as Twitter.
Simondon’s reluctance to allow social aspects into his theory of concretization cannot be sustained when considering contemporary networked media technologies, other than at the cost
of their being denied technological status. (Mills 2011: 225)

Mills argues that Simondon’s insistence on the purity of mechanical evolution and dismissal of mechanical adornment is insuﬃcient to interrogate the cultural phenomena that
are programmed into software. Similarly, I claim that the emergence of the digitalised
object relies on input from artists, designers and engineer and such ‘fabricated intention’
requires the translation of an object from the real world into discrete bits that then become
available for manipulation. The givenness of data must be constructed and programmed in
the digital domain and is not something emergent in a Simondonian (or enactive) sense
but something that must be constituted upon diﬀering relations of data and the ontologies
that underpin computational systems.
As Hui notes, hylomorphism remains a dominant engineering principle in computer
science, evidenced in the development of the semantic web through web-based languages
and protocols such as HTML (Hyper Text Markup Language).
… the concept of form continues to serve as a technical tendency within computing, although
it is now standards that have become universal. Forms are abstract schemes, and standards
are concrete objects. (Hui 2016: 67)

However, the real world is non-computational and material objects require translation
from the real world into discrete bits – to be objectiﬁed. As David Berry highlights, ‘To
mediate an object, a computational device requires that it be translated’ (Berry 2011:
14). Such translation requires a trimming of the informational content in order that it
can be encoded. Furthermore, the hidden, discrete nature of such ‘programmed givenness’
mediates the very representations we see on the screen. Computation through the ‘givenness’ of its data, is integrated into the associated milieu of the living being, that following
Hayles, subtends and feeds-forward into human cognition. Or as Berry notes:
What is happening in the ‘digital age’ is that we increasingly ﬁnd a computational dimension
inserted into the ‘given’ […] the ontology of the computational is increasingly hegemonic in
forming the background presupposition for our understanding the world. (Berry 2011: 128)

The digitalised object highlights how the digital fabrication of objects passes through
the ontological distinction between the analogue (bodily) ﬂow of continuous experience
to the discrete nature of digital recombination. It does this by seamlessly operating, in
the Simondonian sense, as part of our technical milieu and by processing information
beyond our cognitive abilities. How does the idea of the openness and autonomy of the
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concrete object, apropos Simondon, cohere with the body, artisan making, and as we have
seen, the algorithm and digital/digitalised objects? Do such objects approach the openness
synonymous with the body of living beings? Such questions require a rethink of what is
given in this manifold of data that preﬁgure and shape our experience and relations to
objects. But as Simondon reveals, a phenomenological description of objects (not to
mention technicity) can only get us so far, and it is only through conceiving of a more
relational account of technics that we can reveal the inherent complexity of such digital
technologies and our relationship to them.
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